I uncover the existence, extent, and mechanism of export deection, which followed export destruction, after the imposition of export sanctions against Iranian exporters. Using disaggregated data about Iranian exports, I show how exporter size, past export status, and pricing strategy matter in the process of export deection. The main ndings are as follows: (i) two-thirds of the value of Iranian exports thought to be destroyed by export sanctions have actually been deected to non-sanctioning countries; (ii) exports by exporters who exported only to non-sanctioning countries increased signicantly after sanctions; (iii) exporters reduced their product prices as they deected exports to new destinations; (iv) exporters deected more of their core and homogeneous products; (v) larger exporters deected more of their exports than smaller exporters; (vi) the new destinations are more politically-friendly with Iran; and (vii) the probability of an exporter to deect exports to another destination rised if the exporter already existed in that destination, suggesting that costs of exporting matter too. I conclude that export sanctions are less eective in a more globalized world as exporters can deect exports from one destination to another.
Introduction
Milton Friedman said all in all, economic sanctions are not an eective weapon of political warfare.
1 This statement is not necessary always true. To evaluate the eectiveness of economic (i.e., export, import, nancial, and banking) sanctions, it is important to distinguish between their dierent types. Economic sanctions are heterogeneous by denition, so their impacts should not be stereotyped.
In this paper I investigate an eect of a specic type of sanctions: export sanctions.
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Existing literature explains how export sanctions work (Crawford and Klotz (2016) , Davis and Engerman (2003) , Doxey (1980) , Drezner (1999) , Engers (1992, 1999) , Hufbauer et al. (2007) , Joshi and Mahmud (2016) , Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1988) , Levy (1999) , Martin (1993) , Pape (1997) , Tolley and Wilman (1977) , and van Bergeijk (2009)). They seek to lower aggregate welfare of a target state by reducing its exports in order to coerce the target government to change its political behavior. This type of sanctions can coerce either directly, by persuading the target government that the issues at stake are not worth the price, or indirectly, by inducing a popular revolt that overthrows the government, resulting in the establishment of a government that will make the concessions.
However, we still lack empirical evidence about how exporting rms behave when faced with export sanctions. The existing literature does not inform whether exporters stop exporting or just reduce exports to sanctioning countries following sanctions. Also, it does not inform whether and how (some or all) exporting rms deect their exports to new destinations following export sanctions. 3 The ability of rms to deect their exports as well as to start new export relationships can explain partially why Iranian exports increased (Figure 1 ) following the imposition of sanctions. Due to an increasingly globalized economy, alternative destinations exist for exporters aected by export sanctions. In other words, export deection can compensate export destruction and, thus, should not be ignored.
4
In this paper, being able to access the universe of (more than 1.81 million) Iranian non-oil export transactions data, I study the existence, extent, and mechanism of export deection following the 1 Economic Sanctions, Newsweek, 21 January 1980, p. 76. 2 Export sanctions are dierent from embargoes: while export sanctions represent higher export costs (i.e., they raise cost of exporting at the exporter-destination level), embargoes represent a shift to autarky via a trade blockade. In section 2 below I explain in more detail the export sanctions against Iran.
3 Following Bown and Crowley (2007), I dene export deection as a change in the destination of exports in response to an increase in a trade barrier in another market, as when a rise in a tari on an export from A to B causes the exports to be sold instead to C. 8 In 
5
The impact of the nancial sanctions on Iranian economy in 2012 is beyond the scope of this paper, especially as the dataset, which I exploit in this paper, ends in 2011. In 2012, the sanctions moved from country specic restrictions on Iranian exports, as I explain in detail in section 2 below, to limiting Iran's access to the global nancial system, such as the SWIFT.
6 Starting here and onwards in the paper, exports refer to exports. 7 Entry refers to the rst time the exporter or product entered a given destination. Exit refers to the last time the exporter or product was seen at destination, so there should be no confusion with exporters and products that exited and then entered the same destination.
8 Following export sanctions, the number of exported products per exporter to SCs also decreased but increased to addition, in Figures 4a and 4b I show aggregate exports to selected SCs as well as to selected NSCs.
A novel feature of this paper is an investigation of export deection following export sanctions.
Exporter-level data allows me to uncover action taking place within exporters and across destinations.
Precisely, I show that while export sanctions against Iranian exporters led to export destruction, they caused deection in exports of these exporters to destinations that did not impose export sanctions. This paper is organized into four further sections. The next section gives a brief timeline of the sanctions against Iran, with an emphasis on export sanctions, between January 2006 and June 2011. Section 3 introduces the disaggregated customs dataset that I used in this paper. Section 4 presents the empirical anaylsis. Section 5 concludes.
The sanctions against Iran
This section is divided into two parts. 
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This customs dataset has several advantages. Compared to UN-Comtrade data, given it includes daily records, this dataset allows monitoring short-term trends and dynamics at the micro-level such as entry and exit rates, export volumes and distributions, and prices and growth at the exporterproduct-destination level. Also, it allows distinguishing between the number of products that are exported by each exporter to each destination -the extensive margin, and the export value per product per exporter to each destination -the intensive margin. The use of exporter-level data enables the construction of export margins with exporter-product-destination dimension, which is not the case with product level databases (i.e. UN-Comtrade). Within country pairs, I dene the extensive margin with an exporter-product dimension rather than with a simple product dimension, especially as the average exporter in the dataset exported more than one product. A further advantage of the granular data is that I can see what type of rm is most aected. For example, if the purpose of the export sanctions is to generate revolt, perhaps export sanctions are sensible if small exporters are a large share of employment. However, if the purpose is to aect aggregate exports and access to foreign reserves, then the sanctions are less likely to be successful because the large exporters, who account for the bulk of exports, may deect exports.
This dataset has three caveats as well. First, I cannot know the probability of a rm to become an exporter. I only have data on rms that export (not on exporters and non-exporters). But, knowing this probability is beyond the scope of this study. I am mainly interested in studying whether and how existing exporters reallocate their exports across destinations following export sanctions. The second caveat concerns the time period covered by the dataset and this study. I observe three years after the imposition of non-oil export sanctions against Iranian exporters, so the empirical exercise considers only the short-term changes in behavior of exporters following sanctions. The third caveat is that But, given the scope of this paper, this caveat is not a hurdle.
For each quarter, I report in Table A 
Empirical analysis
In this section I present the empirical analysis in two steps. First, I document the existence of export destruction and deection. Second, I highlight the mechanism through which export deection occurred as well as the extent to which export destruction had been compensated by export deection following export sanctions against Iran.
Existence of export destruction and deection
I identify the eect of export sanctions on Iranian export destruction at the exporter-destination level. Figures 2, 5, 6 , and 7 show that Iranian exports to sanctioning countries were steady before sanctions but decreased afterwards. Figure 2 shows that Iranian exports to non-sanctioning countries 29 See Table A .II for more descriptive statistics at the annual-level, following the decomposition format of Eaton et al. 
where X et refers to dierent measures in the dierent estimations in Table 1 . In (1) X et refers to the total exports at time t. In (2) X et refers to the total exports by exporters who exported only to NSCs at time t. In ( Before investigating export destruction and deection, it is worth noting the change in exports of all Iranian exporters and in exports of Iranian exporters who exported only to non-sanctioning countries. Row (1) of Table 3 shows the growth in overall exports before and after sanctions. Average monthly export growth rate increased after sanctions from 0.24% to 1.48%. This pattern corresponds
with Figure 1 that shows that overall exports increased following sanctions. Row (2) of Table 3 shows the growth in exports of exporters who exported only to NSCs. Again, their average monthly export growth rate increased after sanctions from 0.71% to 2.64%. This pattern corresponds with the red (dotted) line in Figure 5 .
Export destruction is captured in the estimations in row (3) of In addition, the fact that intercept α 2 is lower than α 1 strengthens the nding of the existence of a structural break. This pattern corresponds to the export destruction pattern that is seen along the blue line in Figure 7 .
Row (4) of Table 1 In addition, the fact that intercept α 2 is higher than α 1 strengthens the nding of the existence of a structural break. This pattern corresponds to the export deection trend that is seen along the red line in Figure 7 . These results highlight that Iranian exporters to both destinations experienced an increase in exports to non-sanctioning countries. Thus, when Iranian exporter-level exports to sanctioning countries declined because of export sanctions, there was an associated increase in Iranian exporter-level exports to non-sanctioning countries ( Figure 7 ).
Which exporters were aected most? While the above results show that the imposition of sanctions had a signicant negative impact on the average Iranian exporter to SCs, they possibly hide some heterogeneity among exporters. One can expect larger and more experienced exporters to be aected dierently as they are typically more productive and can aord higher export costs. On this basis, I repeated estimations (3) and (4) in Table 1 to see the impacts on small and large exporters. I dened large exporters as the exporters whose monthly export value was above the export value per average exporter before March 2008 at sanctioning countries and small exporters as the exporters whose monthly export value was below the export value per average exporter before March 2008 at sanctioning countries. Small exporters suered from more export destrution than large exporters (rows 3a and 3b of The above ndings are also supported by an assessment of the impact of sanctions on the rates of entry and exit of exporters at the destination level, using the following estimation: Table 2 shows that export sanctions reduced exporter entry rate by an average of 22.8 percentage points to sanctioning countries compared to non-sanctioning countries.
And, column 3 of Table 2 shows that export sanctions increased exporter exit rate by an average of 8.6 percentage points from sanctioning countries compared with non-sanctioning countries.
While Entry dt and Exit dt allow focusing on the extensive margin, ADD dt and Drop dt allow looking at the intensive margin. Precisely, I looked at whether exporters introduce more new products to nonsanctioning countries and drop more of the existing products from sanctioning countries. Column 5 of Table 2 shows that export sanctions reduced the share of exporters that introduced a new product to sanctioning countries by an average of 15.1 percentage points compared to non-sanctioning countries.
And, column 7 of Table 2 shows that export sanctions increased the share of exporters that dropped an existing product from sanctioning countries by an average of 24.2 percentage compared to nonsanctioning countries.
That said, it is important to reect on whether exports to sanctioning countries were going to fall regardless of sanctions due to other reasons such as the trade collapse that followed the global recession in 2008. Export sanctions came along just few months before the global economic crisis broke in fall of 2008. The economic crisis may have obscured the eects of export sanctions on Iranian export deection given the countries that imposed sanctions were actually hit by the crisis more than other countries. Given traded-goods sectors are procyclical, one explanation is that Iranian exports to sanctioning countries fell due to the recession in these economies. Another explanation is that increasing trade frictions at the international borders, broadly dened, might be the culprit. In other words, if export destruction was caused by the recession and not by export sanctions, then I should expect a similar pattern of imports of SCs and NSCs from Iran. However, it is not the case. Figure   8 shows the growth rates of China's imports from Iran as well as China's and U.S.'s total imports, and economic growth over time. Clearly, the crisis aected Iranian exports to both U.S. and China.
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However, following the crisis, Iranian exports to China rose again, unlike in the case of U.S. although its imports from other countries rose again. This pattern suggest that the bulk of the decline in Iranian exports to specic destinations is attributable to the imposition of sanctions.
Also, it is worth mentioning a note about export transshipments. Iranian exporters to UAE and other destinations, I cannot identify which rms are exactly exporting from UAE. That is why I cannot establish whether export transshipments by same exporters followed export sanctions. And, that is why I include this part in the appendix. In Table A .IV I present descriptive statistics about potential Iranian export transshipment that happened through UAE following the imposition of export sanctions on Iranian exporters. First, I look at the percentage change in exports of exporters that exited or reduced their exports to the US, UK, Canada, and France, following the imposition of export sanctions, between the pre-and post-export sanctions periods. Second, I track the exports of the same exporters, at the product-level, to UAE following their exit from or reduction of exports to the 4 mentioned destinations. Third, I get an aggregate measure of product-level re-exports from UAE to the 4 mentioned destinations. While I conduct the rst two steps using Iranian Customs data as the interest is primarily in the exporter-level export transshipment, I used UN-Comtrade data for the third step as I do not have access to UAE customs importer-exporter level data.
The results
in Table A .IV allow observing a trend (but not a causal relationship) of export transshipment, at the product-level, of Iranian exporters through UAE ports.
Mechanism of export deection
The price of export deection: If Iranian exporters reduced prices of products that they deected, the change in product prices should be reected in the unit values of the products exported to NSCs after March 2008. I focus mainly on the products that exporters deected from SCs to NSCs as no price change is expected in new products which were introduced following export deection to serve the needs of new customers in NSCs. A change in the unit value of a given product in the data can be consistent with a combination of (i) a change of the product quality, (ii) other changes in product characteristics that make the product more desirable or aordable to consumers in lower The results presented in Figure 9 indicate that deecting exporters reduced their product prices by, on average, 7.4% in the rst shipment following export deection compared to prices of same products in their last shipment before export deection. Also, the right bar in Figure 9 shows a 1.8% drop in the average price in the same products sold by other Iranian exporters that were already existing in the new destination at the time of rst shipment by deecting exporters, after export deection took place.
34 One potential explanation for this price reduction is that deecting exporters reduced their prices in an attempt to enter the new markets and scramble for new consumers.
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To check for evidence on changes in product prices following export deection, I compared product prices of deecting exporters in the rst shipment to a non-sanctioning country following March 2008 with (i) the prices of same products by same exporters in their last shipment to a sanctioning country as follows:
where P ept is the price of product p exported by exporter e at time t and P ept−1 is is the price of product p exported by exporter e at time t − 1. I focus here on exporters who reduced their product exports to zero in sanctioning countries after March 2008 and existed in non-sanctioning countries after March 2008. Thus, this estimation allows me to capture the product price dierences over time by the same exporter at sanctioning countries before sanctions (t < 27) as well as between sanctioning countries and non-sanctioning countries (t ≥ 27). The results preseted in Table 3 support 34 The new product prices of deecting exporters were, on average, 1.1% lower than the average prices of the same products sold by other Iranian existing exporters in the new destination at the time of the rst shipment following export deection.
35 I have also checked the product prices of deecting exporters over time. Product prices did not change the longer (i.e., the second year) deecting exporters remain in new markets.
the observed pattern that we see in Figure 9 . The coecientβ 4 shows that after export deection, deecting exporters reduced their product prices by 8.1%.
The role of exporter size: Exporters are not equal in their ability to deect exports from one destination to another. When trying to understand the dynamics of export deection, one must ask whether all or which exporters deected exports from sanctioning countries to non-sanctioning countries. The size and experience of exporters are expected to aect their ability, willingness, and decision to deect exports. To test whether this prediction is true, I estimate the following model:
Def lect e|t>26 = α0 + α5lnX e|pre−sanctions + α6lnExperience e|pre−sanctions + γe + κt + et Column 1 of Table 4 shows that larger and more experienced exporters have higher probabilities of deecting exports following sanctions. This observation is consistent with the exporter-heterogeneity assumption which suggests that exporters have specic productivities and behave dierently in export markets. Figure 10 complements this result by showing how much of export volumes deecting exporters were actually able to deect. In Figure 10 I divided the exporters into two groups: small exporters whose monthly export value was below the export value per average exporter before sanctions and large exporters whose monthly export value was above the export value per average exporter in the sanctioning country (that they deected from) during the month of their last shipment. Large deecting exporters achieved higher level of export deection, on average, than small deecting exporters. While large exporters deected on average 86% of their exports, small exporters deected on average 16% of their exports from SC to NSCs.
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The role of past export status: Exporting to a destination requires incurring sunk and variable (5) and (6) include an exporter-size control, lnX e|pre−sanctions , as larger rms are typically more productive and have better performance in export markets (Bernard and Jensen (2004) ) which improve exporting activity and, by denition, rm size is a proxy for past success. Equation (6) models the probability of exporting to a given destination when sanctions are imposed in a dierent destination (extensive margin). P (EXP ) epControl|post−sanctions is a binary variable that equals to 1 if the exporter had exported product p to NSC after sanctions were imposed, and zero otherwise.
Column (1) of Table 5 shows the estimation results of equation (5). The imposition of export sanctions resulted in a 65% [100*(exp(0.501)-1] increase in Iranian exporter-product level exports to NSC that these same exporters had previously exported the same product to. This result shows that exporters increase their export values to alternative destinations that they are already existing in i.e., along their intensive margin when they face export sanctions by a particular export destination. In addition, this result suggests that it would be easier for an exporter to deect part or all of its exports from a SC to a NSC if she already exists in the latter destination. The reason is that, in addition to sunk entry costs that have an eect on the extensive margin, exporters incur variable costs after entry. These variable costs at a given destination can be lower for exporters who already exist in that destination.
Column (2) of Table 5 shows the estimation results of equation (6) . The interaction of export sanc-tions with export status variables has a higher economic signicance for ExporterB than ExporterA.
This result suggests that the exporter's probability of deecting product exports to a NSC is higher if the exporter had already served that destination before. And, it shows that export deection probability is lower for exporters that did not serve a NSC before March 2008. In terms of economic interpretation: the imposition of export sanctions against certain exporters by a particular destination increases their export probability to a NSC by 9.2% if they had already exported another product to that destination but only by 5.3% if they had not exported at all to that destination before. The lower economic signicance level of the coecient of ExporterA interaction demonstrates that past export status matter in determining an exporter's decision to deect exports when faced with export sanctions by a particular destination.
The above results are also supported by Figure 11 . Figure 11 shows the extent to which Iranian Product selection during export deection: The literature emphasizing heterogeneity at the product level predicts that core competence products are the most responsive to new export environments (Eckel and Neary (2010)). For that, I examined whether Iranian exporters, who succeed to deect their exports following export sanctions tend to deect more of their core-competence products.
In addition, products have dierent export trends and characteristics. For example, some products are homogeneous while others are dierentiated (Rauch (1999) ).
37 So, I also examined whether homogeneous products are more likely to be deected by deecting exporters following sanctions from sanctioning countries to non-sanctioning countries. The hypothesis is that it is easier for exporters to 37 An example of a homogeneous products is copper, and an example of a dierentiated product is carpets. Rauch (1999) oers more details about the motivation of this product classication. The basic idea is that dierentiated products require more marketing.
deect homogeneous products as the cost of searching for consumers of these products is lower given these products are typically standard in terms of content and quality (i.e. copper) compared to other products (i.e. carpets), and thus require less marketing.
I examine the above hypotheses using this estimation:
Def lect ep|t>26 = α 0 + α 15 X pre−def lection + α 16 Xshare pre−def lection + α 17 Dif f + γe + κ d + ept
where Def lect ep|t>26 equals to one if the exporter dropped a given product from a SC and, then, introduced it in a NSC after March 2008 , and zero otherwise. X pre−def lection is the log of export value of the product at the exporter-destination level before export deection from a treated destination.
Xshare represent the weight of the product in the portfolio of the exporter before export deection from a SC. Dif f is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if the product is dierentiated, and zero otherwise. Following Eckel and Neary (2010), I dene core competence products at the exporterdestination level as the most successful products, products of highest sales volume.
The results in column 1 of Table 6 show that higher export value and share of exports of a given product by a given exporter to a treated destination are associated with higher probability that the product gets deected by the exporter. Also, the movement of Dif f from 0 to 1 decreases the probability that the given product gets deected by its exporter from a SC to a NSC. In other words, homogeneous products have higher export deection probability. The results are statistically signicant at less than 5% level. These observations support the assumption of product dierentiation made by Eckel and Neary (2010) and the work of Rauch (1999) .
Destination selection during export deection: While deecting exports, do exporters target destinations randomly? To know which destinations deecting exporters targeted, I estimate the following equation:
where the dependent variable is the log of total number of deecting exporters to a given destination at a given month. And, Z dt is a vector of controls capturing economic size, distance, price competitivenesss, ease of imports, foreign direct investment net inows, tari rate, import growth, the correlation of positions during votes on resolutions in the General Assembly of the United Nations 38 as well as the number of Iranian immigrants 39 and existing Iranian exporters at the new destination that deecting exporters deected to. I control for UN vote correlation because it is a good measure of ideological, cultural, and historical anity between countries that may aect bilateral trade. The coecients in Table 7 show that larger and closer markets; markets with higher import, income, and FDI growth rates; as well as destinations that have fewer import restrictions, lower tari rates, more
Iranian immigrants, higher number of Iranian existing exporters, and are more politically-friendly with Iran (in terms of voting similarities at UN) attracted more of the deecting exporters. All results are statistically signicant at conventional levels. These results are independent of consumer price index at destination. As expected, the ination variable has a positive coecient: an increase in prices at destination creates more demand for imported products. Moreover, time xed eects control for real exchange rate uctuations in the Iranian currency vis-a-vis currencies of all destinations.
Conclusion
How rms behave when faced with export sanctions is of interest to trade economists and policy- Entry refers to the rst time the exporter entered a given destination. Exit rates refer to the last time the exporter was seen at destination, so there should be no confusion with exporters that exited and then entered the same destination.
Source: Author's calculations using Iranian Customs data Source: Author's calculations using Iranian Customs data Def lect e|t>26 Source: Author's estimations using Iranian Customs data. lnX e|pre−sanctions denote exporter-size. P (EXP ) epN SC|post−sanctions is a binary variable that equals to 1 if the exporter had exported product p to destination d after sanctions were imposed, and zero otherwise.
Source: Author's estimations using Iranian Customs data. Def lect ep|t>26 equals to one if the exporter dropped a given product from a sanctioning country and, then, introduced it in a NSC after March 2008 , and zero otherwise. X pre−def lection is the log of export value of the product at the exporter-destination level before export deection from a sanctioning country. Xshare represent the weight of the product in the portfolio of the exporter before export deection from a sanctioning country. Dif f is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if the product is dierentiated, and zero otherwise a denotes statistical signicance at the 1% level. b denotes statistical signicance at the 5% level.
Source: Author's estimations using Iranian Customs data. between pre-and post-sanctions periods. A product is dened as an HS 6-digit category.
